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Abstract
During their history the Ottoman Empire and Japan had almost no mutual contact and were 
hardly aware of each other. This situation changed at the end of the 19th century, when the 
Ottomans were interested in Japanese modernization according to the western model in order 
to apply the Japanese model on their own crumbling empire. On the other hand, some Japa-
nese viewed the Ottoman Empire as an exotic oriental country and were eager to discover its 
history and culture. On this basis the relations between both countries were established. One 
of the most important proponents of Ottoman-Japanese relations was Yamada Torajirō, who 
came to Istanbul in 1892. He was to stay there for next 22 years. Although he wasn’t able to 
secure any radical political or economic interests for Japan in Istanbul, his activity brought a 
period of intensifying contacts between both countries. He also introduced Japanese culture 
and customs to Istanbul and after his return to Japan he wrote a lot of books about Turkey, in 
which he promoted the idea of Japanese-Turkish friendship. His work is therefore considered 
to be the fundamental basis of the good relations of Japan and Turkey up to the present time.
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1)  This article was created with the support of the Motivation System of the University 
of West Bohemia in Pilsen, part POSTDOC.
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The Question of the Japanese-Ottoman relation is almost forgotten by contemporary 
historiography. Only in Japan and Turkey the names of Yamada Torajirō and his compa-
triots who stayed in Istanbul before the First World War are still remembered. At the 
first glance both countries had almost nothing in common at the end of the 19th century. 
They had no mutual interests; the great geographic distance between them hindered 
any mutual cooperation, trade or cultural exchange. In fact their “awareness of each 
other [even in the second half of the 19th century] was minimal”.2 On the other hand, in 
the first half of the 19th century, the conditions of both countries were quite similar. Both 
were to a certain degree isolated from the western world and this led to their underde-
velopment in comparison with the West. In both countries the central government 
crumbled, which can be documented on the process of disintegration of the Ottoman 
Empire3 and the growing power of local daimyos in Japan.4 As for their internal situation, 
privileged classes – samurai in Japan and janissaries and traditional structures in the 
Ottoman Empire – governed both states. Clash with the West meant a harsh experience 
for both states and had similar military, political and cultural impact, although it must 
be stressed that Japan had geographical advantages and the Ottoman Empire was ne-
ver wholly isolated from Europe.
The impact of the European imperial challenge was also similar – the fall of 
the existing ruling classes (although parts of them created new ruling elites) and the 
endeavors for reforms. In this process Japan was much more successful thanks to its 
illustrious reformers, geographical advantage, national unity and the ability to utilize its 
meager resources to maximum. During the 80s and 90s of the 19th century Istanbul be-
came aware of the success of the Japanese reforms and began to look at Japan for inspi-
ration. The interest of the Ottoman public in Japanese success to embrace the western 
methods and in transformation its society according to the European model, grew sur-
prisingly when Turkish and Arabic newspapers regularly discussed the Japanese situati-
on and progress.5 “It was widely believed that the example of Japan could instruct the 
2)  In previous centuries the Japanese had only slight information about Turkey from the 
accounts of the Dutch and Portuguese tradesmen. Also the Ottomans had only knew 
about Japan only by hearsay and their scarce information were limited to some popular 
travel accounts (Esenbel 1996, 238).
3)  To the process of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the 18th and 
19th century see Hanioğlu (2008, 6–18).
4)  To the situation of Japan in the first half of the 19th century see Keene (2002, 1–9).
5)  Hundreds of references to Japan and its success could be found in the Ottoman books 
and newspapers articles during the second half of the 19th century (Worringer 2004, 
208). After the Japanese victory over Russia, the radical officers leading the Young Turk 
movement used the Japanese example to promote the idea of restoring the constitution 
Ottoman Empire in its quest for true enlightenment. Japan’s history, national culture, heri-
tage, and religion, as well as its political organization, military, and economy, were just a 
few of the topics examined in these texts, which illustrated what Ottomans writers of diffe-
rent backgrounds proposed to be successful development into a modern nation and state. 
Japan was perceived to have accomplished these two objectives through a successful inte-
gration of Eastern cultural heritage and the appropriate Western material attributes.”6 
Even the Hamidian regime noticed the Japanese success and sought to teach its me-
thods to implement them to the Ottoman reform efforts. Therefore in response to the 
visit7 of a member of the Japanese imperial family Prince Akihito Komatsu (in my paper 
a use the Japanese system putting the family name first) to Istanbul (where he presen-
ted the Japanese highest Order of Chrysanthemum to the Sultan Abdülhamid),8 the 
Porte decided to send frigate Ertuğrul to Japan.9 This almost 30 years old vessel,10 which 
was considered to be barely seaworthy by British observers,11 anchored in Yokohama 
with its more than 600 seamen and a special mission which task was to establish good 
and permanent relations with Japan.12 On 13th June 1890 Emperor Mutsuhito received 
its commander Admiral Ali Osman Paşa. The three-month visit to Japan was a diploma-
tic success and in September 1890 the ship was prepared to start its voyage back to 
Istanbul. On its way the frigate was caught in a storm in which the main mast of the fri-
gate collapsed and due to the inexperience of its crew the immobilized ship hit a reef 
split in half and sank near Oshima Island on the 18th September 1890. The Japanese 
government sent a rescue mission that was capable of salvaging 69 men from the see – 
the rest of the crew, 533 seamen including Ali Osman Paşa, died.13
of 1876 (Lewis 2002, 206–207).
6)  Worringer 2004, 210.
7)  The first greater interest of the Japanese in the Near East was sparkled by the Iwakura 
mission to Europe and America, which on its way back stopped in Egypt (see Nish 1998).
8)  Esenbel 1996, 240, compare with Erdemir 2011, 219.
9)  Esenbel 1996, 239.
10)  The frigate was build in the years 1854–1864 by Istanbul’s Ta ̧skızak shipyard. It was 
a 79 meters long vessle of 2,344 tons (Lledó and Pulak 2007, 35–36).
11)  Although the ship was overhauled before the start of the voyage, it suffered many 
maintenance problems. The frigate was damaged after it ran ashore in the Suez Canal 
and the damage of the hull was not completely repaired. The ship had also problems with 
its almost a quarter of century old machinery (Lledó and Pulak 2007, 36).
12)  Erdemir 2011, 219.
13)  Lledó, Pulak 2007, 36, compare with Esenbel 1996, 240. The survivors were brought 
to Turkey on board of Japanese battleships Hiei and Kongo in January 1891 (see Erdemir 
2011, 220). A detailed account of the Ertuğrul voyage and catastrophe can be found on 
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The catastrophe brought about a wave of compassion in Japan where a be-
neficial collection was spontaneously initiated to help the families of the drowned sai-
lors. Altogether a considerable sum of 5,000 Yen was donated.14 The task to bring the 
money to Istanbul was entrusted to Yamada Torajirō, who already in the 80s urged to 
establish Japanese-Ottoman relations. He was born in 1866 in a traditional samurai Na-
kamura family in the town Numata and after his father decided to move to Tokyo, he 
was given a mixed education both classical and western. He learned several foreign lan-
guages including French, German and English and became a master of the tea ceremony 
in the Yamada School from which his name was derived from.15 As a person of higher 
society origin and as a contributor to the newspapers Nihon Shimbun and Tokyo Nichi-
nichi Shimbun he became well known in the reform circles of Japan.16 Because of his 
participation in organizing the collection and his far-reaching knowledge he was sent to 
Istanbul on a partially official mission initiated by the Japanese foreign minister Aoki 
Shūzō.17 With a task to hand over the collected money to the Ottoman government and 
to establish direct mutual relations between both countries Yamada left Japan on board 
of a cruiser Matsushima. After a brief stay in Egypt, where he was warmly welcomed, 
Ymada reached Istanbul on 4th April 1892 probably not knowing that his mission to the 
capital of the Ottoman Empire would last more than 20 years.
Yamada than 25 was warmly greeted in Istanbul, where he presented his gift 
to Şerif Paşa (a son of the Ottoman foreign minister Mehmed Said Paşa) who arranged 
Yamada’s audience at the Sultan, whom he presented a gift of the traditional Japanese 
armor and a sword, which can be now seen in Topkapi Palace Museum.18 Yamada’s char-
ming behavior and noble performance at the court made him many supporters who 
appointed him to teach the Ottoman sailors and military men Japanese for them to be 
able to go to Japan to be educated there.19 During next month Yamada was able to mas-
ter Ottoman Turkish, although he was able to communicate in French in which the Otto-
mans were fluent. His mastery of the Turkish earned him quite a lot of sympathy from 
the educated Ottomans who appreciated that Yamada is able to communicate with 
them with their own language.
Tragedy – Ertugrul Frigate, http://www.turkjapan2003.org/rel/ertugrul.htm, 11. 2. 2012.
14)  Esenbel 1996, 241.
15)  Erdemir 2011, 219. Yamada alone became a head of Sōhenryū School of the tea 
ceremony (Mizuguchi 2002, 93).
16)  Erdemir 2011, 219.
17)  Esenbel 1996, 241.
18)  Esenbel 1996, 241.
19)  Esenbel 1996, 242.
While he was in Istanbul Yamada slowly changed over this time into a well-
-known expert on the Ottoman policy, culture and life. He even got well known in the 
Ottoman high society with which members he started to maintain close relations. 
Thanks to this he became some sort of “a mediator between the Turkish and Japanese 
bureaucrats and intellectuals”.20 He published his knowledge about Turkey – its political, 
economic and cultural realities – in several papers in Japan – for example Toruko zūshin 
(News from Turkey) and in popular magazine Taiyō. Later he also published several 
books including Kaikoyōen (The world of Islam) in 1939, which was very popular during 
the Pacific war when the Japanese interest in Islam grew due to the fact that they came 
into direct contact with Muslim population of the Dutch East Indies which were under 
the Japanese occupation.21 “Probably Yamada’s most interesting work is also his first, the 
beautifully illustrated Toruko gakan or A pictorial look at Turkey, published in Meiji 40 
(1910).22 A narrative and pictorial introduction to the sites and people of Istanbul, its 179 
pages are liberally sprinkled with Yamada’s own etchings and drawings of people and sites 
of the city during the Hamidian era. The originality of the book lies in these sketches. They 
ate scattered through the text in a charmingly idiosyncratic manner (Byzantine coins for 
example illustrate his discussions of Muslim wedding customs). Yamada says of this free 
approach in his introduction that he chose to illustrate according to personal taste rather 
than attempt to integrate the sketches into the text logically. His illustrations are usually 
based on photographs taken with his Kodak camera, although some are sketches of people 
and faces met in the streets of Istanbul.”23 
Although Yamada’s publications were designed to be a precise picture of the 
Ottoman life it must be said that they in some way romanticized the Ottoman realities.24 
But may be thanks to this fact, they gained a lot of popularity among Japanese public 
which was keen on reading about the exotic oriental life. It was due to this popularity that 
the interest of Japanese public in the Near East resulted in growing popularity of the 
Ottoman Empire in Japan. The Japanese became interested in the Ottoman political re-
alities and culture. The peak of this interest initiated by Yamada came in the 30s of the 
20th century, when there was even established an Islamic Printing House in Tokyo, where 
a group of Turks of Tartar origin printed Turkish Islamic books in Arabic characters.25 
There were even thoughts among young radicals supporting The Great Asian Movement 
in Japan to utilize these endeavors of Turkish intellectuals in Japan, to the purpose of Ja-
20)  Erdemir 2011, 221.
21)  Esenbel 1996, 245.
22)  A contemporary tradition in Japan was to date the years by an era of ruling Emperor.
23)  Esenbel 1996, 246–247.
24)  Esenbel, 248.
25)  Misawa 2009, 39.
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panese interests, but eventually these thoughts were abandoned.26 In the 90s of the 19th 
century the Japanese newspapers started to publish regular information about the poli-
tical development on the Balkans and in Istanbul. The impression of most of the articles 
was pro-ottoman and due to the worsening Japanese-Russian relations anti-Russian.
The main interest of Japanese public laid in the culture of Tukey (this de-
mand was on the first place satisfied by Yamada’s books) and especially in the political 
events in the Near East. Every main political event was closely observed, although the 
diplomats of the Great powers claimed that some of the Japanese newspapers were not 
well informed and restricted themselves only to reprinting the messages of the Europe-
an news agencies.27 The overall impression of the Japanese articles concerning the Eas-
tern Question was pro-British and unfavorable not only to Russia, but also to the powers 
of the Triple Alliance – especially Germany. These anti-German tendencies in the Japa-
nese press were caused by the participation of Berlin in the Russian intervention in 1895, 
which forced Japan to abandon the most important gains from its victorious war with 
China.28 As for the individual newspapers (which called the Near East as “Far West”) the 
most anti-German was the nationalistic Nichi-Nichi, while the others tried to maintain 
neutral stance, although even such newspapers as Japanese Chronicle or Asahi critici-
zed the foreign policy of Berlin and Vienna in Istanbul especially in context of the great 
international crisis such as were the Sanjak railway crisis or the Bosnian annexation cris-
is.29 The political stance of Yamada and many Japanese in Istanbul was on the side of 
Great Britain, Yamada therefore criticized several times the policy of the Central Powers 
especially Germany. This was made clear for example during the Sanjak railway crisis, 
when Japanese residents came to a conclusion that Vienna abandoned reform pro-
grams on the Balkans in favor of her own interests.30 The Japanese watched the Balkan 
turmoil carefully, because they were concerned that the rivalries of the European Great 
Powers could lead to the outbreak of a war, which would negatively influence Japan.
Although Yamada’s activity in Istanbul had a considerable cultural impact – 
he even performed traditional Japanese tea ceremony for the members of the Ottoman 
ruling class31 – his mission had also economic and politic importance. With regard to the 
26)  Misawa, 40.
27)  Ambró to Aehrenthal, Tokyo, 24th February 1908, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, 
Vienna (hereafter: HHStA), Politisches Archiv (hereafter: PA), Türkei Kt. 345.
28)  Ambró to Aehrenthal, Tokyo, 2nd März 1908, HHStA, PA, Türkei Kt. 346. To the 
question of Treaty of Shimonoseki and the so-called Triple Intervention see Paine 2005, 
247–293.
29)  Ambró to Aehrenthal, Tokyo, 24th February 1908, HHStA, PA, Türkei Kt. 345.
30)  Ambró to Aehrenthal, Tokyo, 24th February 1908, HHStA, PA, Türkei Kt. 345.
31)  Esenbel 1996, 242.
fact that Japan had no diplomatic representation in Istanbul (this was established in 
1921),32 Yamada started to play a role of semi-official Japanese consul to the Ottoman 
government. He therefore participated in signing of two treaties of Japanese-Ottoman 
Friendship in 1893 and 1895, which were negotiated through the Japanese embassy in 
Berlin.33 He also unsuccessfully tried to persuade the Ottoman government to sign a 
commercial treaty with Japan. Yamada claimed that Japan could export to the Ottoman 
Empire some good quality pottery, luxurious goods and rice (on the other hand Japan 
could import peppers, tobacco or valuable metals). However, he was somewhat di-
sappointed, when he wrote, that “the Japanese goods exported to Turkey are mainly rice 
and miscellaneous goods. The amount of Japanese rice export to Turkey is increasing every 
year […] However, their Japanese rice is not imported by us, but by German and English 
hands.”34 As for the possibilities to import Japanese pottery to the Ottoman Empire the 
situation was even more unfavorable: “Pottery, lacquer work and general goods gained 
fame once. The demand was not small, but in our products there were defects […] On the 
other hand, the imitation goods of ours produced in Germany and France have great deal of 
delicate design, therefore, their design is equal to our goods, and they are adequate in 
practical use than ours. Hence our market in Turkey is badly affected […]”35 According to 
Yamada Japan was losing its opportunity and he urged for negotiations of Japanese-
-Ottoman commercial treaty.
The government in Tokyo was however unable to reach such an agreement. 
Its failure was due to the fact that Tokyo was trying to establish commercial relations on 
the ground of the capitulations,36 which were granted to the European powers. This was 
however unacceptable for the Ottomans, whose goal was to get rid of these unequal 
commercial treaties with the west. Japan itself gained equal commercial rights vis-á-vis 
the western powers in the 90s and at the beginning of the 20th century. However, this 
Japanese success was viewed as an example in Istanbul, which was “in no position to 
accept a new international capitulationist treaty”.37 The Japanese-Ottoman negotiations 
lasted throughout the 90s of the 19th and were terminated by the Ottoman side, be-
32)  The first Turkish envoi Hulusi Fuat Tugay came to Tokyo in 1925.
33)  To the question of Ottoman-Japanese diplomacy see Deringil 2003, 42–48.
34)  Erdemir 2011, 221.
35)  Erdemir 2011, 221.
36)  Capitulations – unequal commercial treaties made with the European powers during 
the end of the 16th and 17th century giving those some considerable advantages over the 
domestic traders. This system of the Ottoman foreign trade was abolished only after the 
outbreak of the First World War. To the origins of this system see İnalcik and Quataert 
(2006, 480–483).
37)  Esenbel 1996, 244.
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cause the Japanese were not willing to yield in the question of the unequal treaties, 
which in their eyes should have been the base of economic relations of both countries.38 
In spite of this failure Yamada tried to start the Japanese-Ottoman co-
mmercial relations himself. He supported his friend Nakamura Ejirō to open the first 
Japanese shop in the Ottoman capital.39 Later there were even two Japanese shops in 
Istanbul’s commercial district Pera and in the old city. In these there where traditional 
Japanese goods such as silk or tea sold.40 Yamada was also able to capitalize his conne-
ctions in the circles of the Ottoman high society and imported the Japanese art and 
luxurious goods directly to the court of Sultan Abdülhamid II.41 Nakamura’s and Yama-
da’s store also became an important center for the Japanese tourists and new resi-
dents in Istanbul who were given useful advice about the city and the customs of its 
inhabitants: “Yamada always made a point of bringing his guests to the ceremony of the 
Friday prayer, the selamlık. Japanese visitors were a rarity in the 1890s, and he was the 
city’s only long term Japanese resident. On a bright May morning, Yamada and his guests 
stood spellbound as the Albanian Horseguards trotted up to the palace and took up their 
stations. The sun glinted on their spears as the band struck up the Hamidiye march. Next 
came the officers of the Imperial Guard, mounted on splendid Arab horses in their im-
peccable uniforms, and they too took up their positions inside the Yıldız Palace. Finally the 
sultan, accompanied by the empress dowager and the reigning empress emerged from the 
palace in his landau and proceeded to the mosque. As the clear cry of the muezzin sounded 
the call to prayer, the sultan alighted and all his troops in one voice shouted a loud acclaim. 
When his guest asked Yamada what they were shouting he replied ‘They shout Long Live 
the Sultan!, just as we shout Tenno Heika Bazai! in the presence of our emperor.’”42 The 
climax of Yamada’s commercial effort came in January 1906, when he established su-
ccessful Oriental Papers Making Company, which produced rice paper for tobacco. Ya-
mada was able to get support of Japanese businessmen from the Kansai Region (with 
the center in Osaka) who supported his enterprise.43
Maybe the most important task of Yamada Torajiro in Istanbul was entrusted 
to him during the Russo-Japanese war by the Japanese ambassador in Vienna Makino 
who instructed him to guard Bosporus and report any passing Russian ships and to mo-
nitor Russian movement in the Black sea.44 After the Japanese victories at Port Arthur 
38)  Esenbel 1996, 244.
39)  Esenbel 1996, 237.
40)  Esenbel 1996, 241–242.
41)  Erdemir 2011, 222.
42)  Deringil 2011, 16.
43)  Erdemir 2011, 222.
44)  Esenbel 1996, 242.
the representatives of the Combined fleet worried that the Russians could send not only 
the Baltic but also the Black sea fleet to the Far East and gain a decisive numerical supe-
riority.45 Yamada handled his task with considerable energy – he hired a house near the 
mouth of Bosporus into the sea of Marmara and he utilized other Japanese in Istanbul 
most notably the journalist of newspaper Jiji Noda Shotaro (who had come to Istanbul 
in 1891 along with the survivors of Ertuğrul disaster) along with hired about 20 man to 
monitor the sea passage and report any Russian shipping. In his later account of espion-
age activity in Istanbul “Yamada explains that he … every day scanned the northern hori-
zon through binoculars to see whether the Russian Black Sea Fleet would sail down towards 
the Mediterranean to join the Baltic Fleet on its way to do battle with the Japanese in Port 
Arthur”.46 These monotonous activity was however fruitless because the Russians deci-
ded not to send the Black See fleet to the Far East. Despite of this Yamada’s surveillance 
of the Bosporus was highly praised even by the leadership of the Combined Fleet.47
During the war Yamada also informed the Sultan (who accepted him at an 
audience at least at three opportunities) about the progress of the war. Although he 
noted that the Ottoman officials tried to be neutral during the conflict not to enrage 
Russia, the majority of the Istanbul population was openly supporting Japan, which was 
in their eyes defending the Asian people against the European imperialism.48 Japanese 
victory sparkled a wave of admiration of Japan and was celebrated by most of the Otto-
mans as a victory of Asia over Europe – the name of admiral Togo (victor at Tsushima) 
even became popular among Turkish intellectuals who gave it to their newborn sons. 
For the Turks the Japanese victory was an example that a modern Asian power could 
defeat even the most powerful army in the world. Japan’s success was also celebrated as 
an important victory against the European imperialism.49
Japan, which had risen from a weak Asiatic country to a Great Power status, 
became to be viewed as a model for the Ottoman Empire. The victory of Japan sparkled 
a new phase of interest in this country in Istanbul, where some members of the ruling class 
studied the Japanese culture, history, politics and military in order to adopt them into the 
Ottoman system. The Hamidiyan regime wanted to implement a Japanese civil education 
45)  This enxiety was not without justification. At the end of 1904 the representatives of 
Russian Admiralty really considered the possibility to for a Third Pacific Fleet from the 
ships and men of the Black Sea squadron. However the international situation and the 
closure of the Straits to the warships of any Great Power compelled them to abandon 
such plans (Connaughton 2004, 327).
46)  Esenbel 1996, 242.
47)  Esenbel, 2008, 20ff.
48)  Esenbel 1996, 242.
49)  Esenbel 1996, 243, compare with Findley 2010, 163.
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in order to adopt a Japanese form of “civil morality” – the loyalty of the inhabitants (or citi-
zens) to the state.50 The Ottoman liberals noted that the main advantage of Japan was its 
constitutional system and hoped that the Ottoman constitution of 1876 (suspended by the 
Sultan Abdülhamid in 1878) would be restored. Such a step would in their eyes symbolize a 
reformation of the country in the same way as the Meiji Restoration of 1868 in Japan.51 The 
imitation of the Japanese example should in their eyes lead to modernization and stren-
gthening of the Ottoman Empire, some Ottoman newspapers as Yeni Ikdam claimed that 
the Ottoman Empire could even seek an alliance with Japan, although it assessed the 
chances as slight because of only a few common interests.52 This appreciation of Japanese 
success over historical enemy of the Ottomans was shard throughout the whole Islamic 
world. This was illustrated by the admiration of many Muslim liberals. An Egyptian natio-
nalist Mustafa Kamil praised the Japanese victory as an important step to the defeat of 
European colonialism: “We are amazed by Japan because it is the first Eastern government 
to utilize Western civilization to resist the shield of European imperialism in Asia.”53
Yamada tried to exploit this situation to promote Japanese-Ottoman relati-
ons, but in vain due to the Japanese insistence on signing only unequal treaties with 
Istanbul modeled on the similar agreements of the Porte with the West, although Japan 
itself in the same time tried to get rid of her own unequal treaties with the Great Powers. 
His effort was also impaired by the fact that both countries did not establish official re-
lations. His position in Istanbul was therefore still only of a private person, although he 
was protected by the Porte.54 After the outbreak of the Young Turk revolution Yamada 
hoped to achieve some of his goals, because he had viewed the movement to be similar 
with the process of Meiji Restoration. He even claimed in his works that the Young Turks 
were strongly influenced by Japanese success and encouraged Japanese visitors of 
Istanbul to promote this good impression, which Japan made in Turkey.55
In his assessment of growing Japanese impact on the Ottoman ruling class 
Yamada was to some degree right. The new regime in Istanbul presented itself as pro-
gressive and innovative. It also tried to persuade the western diplomatic representati-
50)  Deringil 2011, 109.
51)  Findley 2010, 165.
52)  Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Constantinopel, 30th November 1911, HHStA, PA, Türkei 
Kt. 205. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador cited that Yeni Ikdam in an article “With 
which power we should make an alliance”. Its author however claimed that the chance to 
conclude an alliance with Japan was slight because both countries had only minor 
common interests.
53)  Esenbel, 2008, 22ff.
54)  Esenbel 1996, 245.
55)  Esenbel 1996, 247.
ves that the Ottoman Empire was the future “Japan of the Near East”.56 Despite the fact 
that the Young Turks looked at Japan with admiration57 mutual relations of both count-
ries deteriorated slowly after 1910, when Japan after the collapse of economic negoti-
ations with the Porte concentrated on much promising and nearer gains in Asia and the 
Ottomans were paralyzed by the war with Italy and especially the Balkan wars. With the 
diminishment of the Japanese-Ottoman relations declined even Yamada’s influence in 
Turkey. However, his articles and messages from Istanbul represented an interesting 
and to some extent unbiased view of current political events. 
Yamada’s anxiety about the possibility of the outbreak of a Great War 
(mentioned above) came to be true in 1914, when he left Istanbul.58 In several following 
years he tried to promote the idea of the Japanese-Turkish friendship and to educate 
Japanese public in the Ottoman realities and customs. In spite of his effort most edu-
cated Japanese viewed the Ottoman Empire and the whole Near East (in Japan called 
Far West) as a far exotic country with which Japan has almost nothing in common. Pa-
radoxically this caused soaring popularity of books and articles describing these coun-
tries, which inspired Japanese imagination. Yamada did not return to Istanbul imme-
diately after the war ended, although he became a chairman of the newly founded 
Japan-Turkey Trade Association in November 1925.59 He visited Istanbul for the last 
time in 1931 with a Japanese economic mission. He was accepted with honors by the 
president of the Turkish Republic Kemal Atatürk and met many of his old friends.60 Ho-
wever, due to his growing health issues this was the last time he came to Turkey alt-
hough he still published articles and books about Turkey and the world of Islam as a 
whole. He died in Tokyo on the 3rd February 1957.
The relations between Japan and the Ottoman Empire are almost unknown 
in the West. However, in Turkey and Japan there are surprisingly a lot of people who co-
mmemorate these events. The memorial of the sinking of Ertuğrul frigate was enlarged 
in 1974 when a Turkish museum was established at this site. The monument itself was 
even visited by Turkish president Abdullah Gül at the occasion of a state visit in Japan 
in 2008.61 The wreck of the ship itself was subjected to an underwater archeological re-
56)  Worringer 2004, 208.
57)  Worringer 2004, 215.
58)  After the end of the war Japanese diplomats participated on concluding the peace 
treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne which formed the present Turkish Republic (Mango 
2009, 161).
59)  Esenbel 1996, 243.
60)  Esenbel 1996, 243.
61)  See Turkish President Gul in Japan, http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haberAr-
chive&ArticleID=23482, 11. 3. 2012.
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search in 2007.62 Although the name and life of Yamada Torajiro lies now almost in obscu-
rity his legacy of maintaining of good Japanese-Turkish relations continues and the ques-
tion of the Japanese-Ottoman relations is not forgotten, which could be considered as 
the legacy of the efforts of his whole life.
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Drahomír Suchánek
Mariano	Rampolla	del	Tindaro	–	
der	exkludierte	Papst
Abstract
The object of the essay is an analysis of the person of the cardinal- secretary of state Mari-
ano Rampolla del Tindaro and his exclusion from the papal election in the conclave in the 
year 1903. The topic of this thesis focuses on one aspect of state interventions in papal 
elections, which is generally called “the right of exclusion” – Jus Exclusivae. The papal con-
clave of 1903 retained considerable importance, when the veto right was applied for the 
last time, and the subsequent legislative process that removed the exclusion right. Mariano 
Rampolla died suddenly in Rome on December 16, 1913 at age seventy. The Rampolla´s 
heritage and successful papal diplomacy continued with his friend and closest collaborator, 
Cardinal Giacomo della Chiesa, later elected as Pope Benedict XV.
Key words: conclave, papacy, papal election, Mariano Rampolla del Tindaro, Pius X, Leo XIII, 
church history, right of exclusion
 „Ich glaube, man übertreibt nicht, wenn man die Ansicht ausspricht, dass ein Konklave im 
Jahre 1908 oder 1910 nur aus einem einzigen Wahlgang mit einer einstimmigen Wahl Ram-
pollas bestanden hätte.“1
1)  Cramer-Klett 1914, 3.
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